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Works councils are required by law in France. They are part of a mixed system
of worker representation in the workplace, which includes union locals. The
actual place and the role of the works council has long been contested between
employers and trade unions, and this has reduced the impact of councils on
company life. During the 1970s, the growing crisis in the labor market, the
decline of Taylorism, and companies' emerging human resource policies exac-
erbated the conflict. Meanwhile, the industrial relations system underwent ma-
jor changes due to new laws and economic and social transformations. Are the
works councils now becoming the focal point of a more active social dialogue?
And is such change possible at a time when the influence of unions on the
workforce is sharply declining?
The characteristics of the French system require works council activities to
be analyzed within the wider framework of industrial relations and its evolu-
tion, keeping the councils' history in mind.
5.1 Legal Framework of Workplace Representation
Collective worker representation at the workplace level is a mixed system
bringing together elected bodies and trade unions. Its purpose was redefined in
1982 with the Auroux reforms, named after the minister of labor of the time.
It is within this framework that the place of works councils in France will
be examined.
Robert Tchobanian is a senior research fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scienti-
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5.1.1 Systems of Workplace Representation
In 1990, there were approximately 19 million workers in France, according
to general census figures. National and local government workers are repre-
sented under special rules. The law regulating worker representation at the
workplace level mainly affects the private and competitive public sectors,
which at the end of 1990 employed about 14 million workers.
The complexity of the workplace representation system required by law var-
ies with firm size. No internal representation system exists for firms with up
to 10 employees. In firms with 11 or more employees, personnel delegates
(delegues du personnel), elected by all employees, are required by law. In com-
panies and establishments with a workforce of 50 or more, there are in addition
enterprise committees (comites d'entreprise ou d'establissement), whose
members are elected in the same way. These companies have also a health and
safety committee (comite d'hygiene, de securite et des conditions de travail—
CHSCT), which is named by the elected enterprise committee and the person-
nel delegates.
Trade unions may set up union locals at the workplace by naming union
delegates (delegue syndical) to the management. Unions have a legal right to
name union delegates in companies with more than 50 employees. In smaller
firms, the personnel delegates can be named union delegates for their term of
office, unless a more advantageous system is created by industrial agreement.
The distribution of workers by size of establishment shows the worker popu-
lations represented by the different arrangements (table 5.1). For companies
and establishments with 50 or more employees, which employ approximately
half of the workforce in the private and competitive public sectors, the repre-
sentation system is made up of four bodies: personnel delegates, the enterprise
committee, the health and safety committee, and union delegates. Personnel
delegates, enterprise committees, and health and safety committees all perform
functions of works councils; they are part of a mixed representation system
which also includes the trade unions.
























Source: UNEDIC 1991.117 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
The enterprise committee comes closest to the definition of a works council
(see Rogers and Streeck, chap. 1 in this volume). All employees of the firm are
represented, not just the union members. The committee is involved in the
economic and organizational life of the firm. In terms of the typology proposed
by Rogers and Streeck, the enterprise committee is a representative council, its
rights being defined by law. In particular, the enterprise committee engages in
three kinds of activity:
1. It manages the funds provided by the firm for social and cultural activities
for the employees and their families. These can be considered indirect wages,
the allocation of which is decided by the enterprise committee.
2. It is entitled to receive information and offer advice on "the firm's organi-
zation, management, and general functioning."
3. It may negotiate agreements on profit sharing (the distribution of part of
the company's annual profits to the employees) and financial participation.
Enterprise committees meet every month. Meetings are chaired by the head
of the firm; a secretary is elected from among the members. Committees are
entitled to 0.2 percent of a firm's total payroll to cover their operating expenses,
and each member is entitled to limited paid release from work, not counting
the time spent in committee meetings. Depending on the size of the firm, com-
missions are set up in which individual employees may be asked to assist the
enterprise committee. Economic training is to be provided to the elected mem-
bers to prepare them for their mission. A certified accountant helps the mem-
bers understand the company's accounts. Under some conditions, the enter-
prise committee may also obtain advice from an outside expert on the
introduction of new technology.
In companies with several establishments, each with its own enterprise com-
mittee, a central enterprise committee exists to deal with problems common to
the entire company. Likewise, companies that are part of a group of companies
have a group committee. Where all of these provisions are applied, the enter-
prise committee, rounded out by the health and safety committee for questions
of occupational hazards, is the representative body with the best access to in-
formation and the strongest technical means for influencing the firm's eco-
nomic and social life and its consequences for the employees.
The situation of the personnel delegates is more complex. They are responsi-
ble for presenting the employer once a month with all individual and collective
grievances concerning the application of legal or contractual rules. They also
present any demands aimed at changing these rules. Thus, their role is similar
to that of the trade unions. Before 1982, they were often the main place of
union expression before management. Personnel delegates do not, however,
have bargaining rights; these belong to the union locals. Their role appears to
be on the decline today.
Union locals, and the union delegates who represent them to management,
play a more general role. Legally, they are in charge of "defending the material118 Robert Tchobanian
and moral interests" of the workers. This includes organizing union life within
the firm, for example, collecting dues and convening union meetings. Coordi-
nating the activities of union members in works councils is another general
prerogative of union locals. Like the personnel delegates, the union delegates
are responsible for representing workers' individual and collective grievances.
But their true representative role lies in the area of collective bargaining. Union
delegates can bargain with management and sign company or plant
agreements. The 1982 legislation makes it obligatory for management to bar-
gain locally on matters like wages, working hours, time schedules, and worker
participation ("expression") at regular intervals. Like elected representatives,
the union delegates are protected against dismissal, and the firm pays them for
a certain number of hours spent on union activities.
Finally, there are links among the enterprise committee, the health and safety
committee, the personnel delegates, and the union delegates. The personnel
delegates may transmit employee demands to the enterprise committee and the
health and safety committee. During their monthly meeting with management,
they may be assisted by a union delegate. Union locals may send representa-
tives to the enterprise committee and thus receive all information provided
to its elected members. The enterprise committee and the health and safety
committee sometimes deal with the same problems. The union locals typically
try to coordinate the activities of the different bodies. For certain questions,
enterprise committee consultations may be carried out in conjunction with ne-
gotiations conducted by the union delegates. During elections of personnel
delegates and enterprise committees, the first round of voting is open only to
the lists of the unions present at the workplace. Nonunion candidates may run
only in a second round, which is called if there are no union lists or if these
did not obtain the votes of the majority of the employees.
Even though it is complicated, this system seems relatively balanced, giving
space to elected bodies representing all employees, as well as to union repre-
sentation. But it is also the result of a long historical process. The place of
workforce representation in the company, and the place of the unions within
such representation, was until recently more a question of power and the result
of mutual distrust between employers and unions than one of stable rules of
joint regulation.
5.1.2 Historical Formation of the Representation System
The present system is the result of an accumulation of representative bodies
that appeared at various stages in the history of the French industrial relations
system and that are the expression of sometimes contradictory choices regard-
ing the levels of collective bargaining, the role of union activity in the plant
and the company, and the proper place of elected employee representation.
Before 1936, employee representation at the workplace was not required by
law. Collective bargaining existed at the industry level. The company was not
a place of bargaining, nor was there internal worker representation. Works119 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
councils had existed in a variety of forms since the middle of the nineteenth
century (e.g., health and safety delegates in coal mines, works councils in the
armaments industry during World War I, and paternalistic councils in individ-
ual companies). But all attempts at legislation on a broader basis failed because
of distrust between employers and unions (Andolfatto 1992). In 1936 the em-
ployers, faced with many strikes, proposed that representatives responsible for
expressing workers' demands be elected by all workers within each establish-
ment, regardless of union membership. Acceptance of the institution of person-
nel delegates was an employer concession made in a crisis to keep unions
themselves out of the workplace. A law on collective bargaining that same year
confirmed that bargaining was to take place mainly on the industry level.
Enterprise committees were created in 1945, in a period of relative social
consensus after the end of World War II. Enterprise committees were to play a
role in the operation of the establishment. They were to be given information
and to be consulted, so as to improve the dialogue between management and
labor. However, the representative trade unions obtained a monopoly over
candidacies in enterprise committee elections, just as in the elections of per-
sonnel delegates. A 1951 law reaffirmed the centralization of collective bar-
gaining at the industry level.
After the severe social conflicts of 1968, a law was adopted entitling unions
to set up locals at the workplace. Very few workers need to be unionized for a
local to come into existence since all that is required is the designation of union
delegates by external unions. From 1968 on, personnel delegates, enterprise
committees, and union delegates coexisted without any clear division of their
tasks. A law adopted in 1971 made it possible to negotiate collective
agreements at the company level. However, while union locals were set up in
large numbers, workplace bargaining did not develop widely.
This was one of the reasons why in 1982 the new leftist government pro-
posed the Auroux reforms. Their purpose was to reform industrial relations,
and particularly representation at the workplace, by linking them to the major
changes that were under way at the time. Employers and unions together had
made the system inoperative. Their traditional positions must be analyzed for
a better understanding of what was at stake with the Auroux reforms and how
they were actually applied. Special attention must also be paid to the economic
situation of the 1970s, especially to the crisis of Taylorist forms of work organ-
ization.
5.2 Workplace Industrial Relations before the 1980s
Traditional French industrial relations assigned little significance to the
workplace. Despite the existence of personnel delegates and enterprise com-
mittees, employers as well as unions preferred to avoid social dialogue at this
level. Employers have traditionally been suspicious of union activities at the
workplace. The position of the works councils is a result of this attitude.120 Robert Tchobanian
5.2.1 Employer Strategies
Neutralizing the Workplace in Industrial Relations
French employers have always tried to protect their discretion in managing
their companies by limiting union intervention and, more generally, any regula-
tion imposed from outside. Personnel delegates and enterprise committees are
representative bodies instituted by law; they may therefore limit the employer's
autonomy. Moreover, they came into being at times when political and social
events had weakened the power of employers.
French employers and their organizations have consistently strived to neu-
tralize the individual company as a place of collective bargaining, resisting
direct union intervention in its functioning. This explains in large part why
bargaining was centralized at the industry level (Sellier 1961). Industrywide
wage agreements set minimum wages, thus regulating the labor market to a
certain extent by limiting competition among companies. Other contractual
provisions standardize general employment conditions. On the other hand, in-
dustrywide agreements almost never affect work rules. Centralized collective
bargaining therefore offers two advantages for the firm: agreements are not
very restrictive at the workplace where they are actually applied, and the organ-
ization of work and the firm is not affected since these are matters that cannot
be regulated in industry-level negotiations. Employers thus avoid union control
over the very heart of company life.
Thus, the company remains in the hands of the employer. Taylorization in
industry illustrates this. It began between the two world wars and went together
with the development of large industry. This rationalization of production was
undertaken without the unions being able to influence organizational choices
or to control their effects on the workers (Ribeill 1984). Work rules imposed
on the workers were determined exclusively by management initiative and the
hierarchy in conceiving tasks and controlling their execution. Similarly, the
social organization of the company was the result of unilateral decisions made
by management.
The neutralization of the firm as a place of bargaining weakens the presence
of the unions at the workplace. The traditional position of French employers
toward works councils is related to this. In a paternalistic strategy, works coun-
cils can be used to limit union influence. But proposed works council legisla-
tion has often been designed to allow for a measure of "workers' control"
(Hordern 1988). The personnel delegates, as set up in 1936, can be considered
as combining these two concepts. By accepting them, employers were able to
avoid direct union representatives. But the activity of the personnel delegates
was one of relaying grievances and demands. They contested employer deci-
sions and were soon perceived as indirectly carrying out union activities. Em-
ployers therefore always tried to limit their role.
Employer attitudes toward the enterprise committees are more complex. En-
terprise committees were created after the war when unions were strong. They121 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
appeared after experiments with worker participation in the management of
some factories at the time when France was liberated. Enterprise committees
did have some effect on company organization and, in this respect, were a
threat to the employer's authority. On the other hand, they came into being
during a time of relative consensus and economic reconstruction. Moreover,
they were not decision-making bodies but bodies of information and consulta-
tion. Also, the fact that the head of the company chaired the enterprise commit-
tee made it easier to integrate them into the life of the company. Employers
have therefore always favored the enterprise committees over the personnel
delegates, and even more over the unions. At the same time, employers never
made an effort to turn them into a more dynamic place for dialogue, and neither
the employers nor the unions have tried to change their mutual relations
through the enterprise committees (Montuclard 1963). In practice, enterprise
committees have therefore often done no more than manage the company's
social budget. Toward the end of the 1960s, however, new horizons began to
open up for works councils.
The 1970s: The Strategy of Direct Participation
The development of French industry after 1950 entailed a high degree of
Taylorization linked to mass production. Assembly lines and jobs requiring
little training became common. The strikes of 1968 brought to light deep re-
sentment among workers, particularly related to working conditions. The em-
ployer organization, the Conseil National du Patronat Francais (CNPF—
National Council of French Employers), for the first time had to accept union
locals at the firm level. In the early 1970s, strikes over the organization of
work became frequent, and workplace-level bargaining appeared necessary for
dealing with the new quality of working life problems that had appeared (Rey-
naud 1968). But employers still refused to expand bargaining at the workplace.
In particular, union locals were accepted only under social pressure. Em-
ployers considered them foreign bodies introduced into the workplace and tried
to limit their role to organizing union activities. A 1974 report studied the
effects of the 1968 legislation on the relationship between enterprise commit-
tees, personnel delegates, and union delegates (Bachy, Dupuis, and Martin
1974). It showed that company management preferred informal over formal
relations with employees, and relations with the elected representatives of all
workers over relations with the union locals. In addition, the enterprise com-
mittee, dedicated to dialogue, was preferred over the personnel delegates, who
expressed worker demands. The traditional suspicion of union activities was
found to persist, and social dialogue with union-dominated works councils
was limited.
It would seem that the social conflicts associated with a Taylorist system of
organization should have modified employer attitudes. Conflicts in Taylorist
factories were often spontaneously initiated by the workers themselves, and an
established bargaining machinery could have helped prevent uncontrollable122 Robert Tchobanian
social outbursts. The unions, however, found it difficult to define offensive
strategies in these areas, given their traditional reticence toward adopting a
position on the operation of the firm. In 1975, an economywide, "interoccupa-
tional" agreement signed by the CNPF and the minority unions stressed the
need to improve working conditions while confirming that responsibility for
this lay with the employers. No machinery was set up to enforce the agreement,
however, and very few clarifying industry or company agreements were
signed.
In subsequent years, companies began to develop their own social policies
in response to the effects of Taylorism, without negotiation and often without
even consulting the works councils: new forms of work organization, opportu-
nities for workers to express their interests directly, changes in work schedules,
communication policies, dialogue with supervisory and managerial staff, and
so forth. At its 1977 and 1980 annual congresses, the CNPF presented summar-
ies of these experiments, proposing to all firms a new, unilateral model for
active social relations at the workplace.
This model was based on the direct mobilization of the workers themselves.
Direct participation enabled the employer to limit union influence and thereby
limit bargaining at the workplace. It also reduced the role of the legally re-
quired works councils. For example, employer-worker committees on safety
and working conditions gave workers the opportunity to participate in improv-
ing safety at work. But they were acting in an area for which two legal commis-
sions connected with enterprise committees already existed. Through social
policies of this kind, employers reintroduced nonrepresentative forms of com-
munication, using problems in working conditions to reassert control in man-
aging the company and its human resources. A 1975 survey of company execu-
tives showed that the majority were still against bargaining and preferred
increased direct participation (Bunel and Saglio 1979).
This is regardless of the fact that works councils, especially in the form of
enterprise committees, would have seemed well suited for assisting with these
new practices. In some cases, organizational innovations had actually been dis-
cussed with and were overseen by the enterprise committee. In 1973, the intro-
duction of variable working hours was legally authorized, contingent on prior
consultation with the enterprise committee. Certain public subsidies to firms
for the improvement of working conditions also required an enterprise commit-
tee opinion. Furthermore, under the law the enterprise committee must be pre-
sented with an annual assessment of the impact of a company's activities and
projects on working conditions. However, firms generally carried out their in-
novative projects without the elected representatives. A survey published by
the CNPF in 1980 spent only a half a page out of 410 pages on enterprise
committees and personnel delegates (CNPF/CODESE 1980).
This attitude can be explained by the influence of the unions on the works
councils. Moreover, the CGT and the CFDT, the unions most strongly repre-123 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
sented on works councils, had at the time a strategy of conflict rather then
aiming at agreement. The employers, in turn, demanded the elimination of the
union monopoly on candidacies in the first round of enterprise committee and
personnel delegate elections. Through their unilateral social policies, employ-
ers wanted to limit both legally and union based intervention to issues covered
by the law or to bargaining outside the firm. A different type of dialogue, estab-
lished directly with the employees, was to be used for dealing internally with
most social questions. In a way, these were "paternalistic" works councils
(Rogers and Streeck, chap. 1 in this volume) created by the employer. But their
very success raised the question of the relationship between them and legally
required worker representation.
At first, companies wanted to protect their autonomy in areas traditionally
beyond union control. But economic difficulties and the loss of competitive-
ness of French industry gave rise to new needs for social and organizational
flexibility. At the end of the 1970s, the CNPF asked that centralized regulation
be reduced in favor of regulations decided upon within the company, but with-
out accepting the unions as bargaining agents at that level. Who was to be
the employer's bargaining partner was unclear. An interoccupational agreement
reached in 1981 linked a reduction in working hours to greater flexibility in
the organization of company time schedules. But the CNPF refused to negoti-
ate time schedules with the union locals and recommended that managements
discuss the subject with the enterprise committee. The CFDT, the second-
largest union, which had signed the agreement, demanded that bargaining
rights be explicitly accorded to the unions alone. The Auroux reforms took
these difficulties into account, along with other needs, in redefining the levels
and actors involved in social dialogue at the workplace.
5.2.2 Union Attitudes before the Auroux Reforms
Employer distrust of works councils before the Auroux reforms is explained
mainly by union policies and their influence on elected representatives. In turn,
the strong position of the employer within the workplace explains the attitudes
of the unions. It is difficult to describe the latter in short because of the variety
of unions in France and the differences between them. The base of the French
union movement lies outside the company. There are four union confederations
that are open to all workers: the Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT), the
Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail (CFDT), the "Force
Ouvriere" (FO), which broke away from the CGT in 1947-48, and the Confed-
eration Francaise des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC). Managerial staff can also
join the Confederation Generale des Cadres (CGC). Here we will primarily
deal with the traditional "mass and class" unionism in industry, which, under
the influence of the CGT, stresses a working-class worldview. This model exer-
cised a certain hegemony in the union movement, as confirmed by election
results. For example, 50.8 percent of the votes in the enterprise committee124 Robert Tchobanian
elections of 1966 went to the CGT, and only 19.1 percent to the CFDT. The
positions of these two unions can be used to describe union attitudes toward
enterprise committees and personnel delegates up to the end of the 1970s.
Union Workplace Organization and Fears of Integration
Attempts to organize union activities within the company always met with
resistance from employers. Perhaps works councils could have been used as an
institutional means of indirectly increasing union influence. But the traditional
weakness of the unions at the workplace explains their hesitation and their
preference for a strategy of conflict. Union strategy on works councils was
long defined by this conflictual stance.
The situation is similar for collective bargaining. Industry-level negotiations
leave the individual firm autonomy and thus give power to the employer.
Company-level bargaining should therefore have been a major union goal. In
fact, union attitudes were not that simple. Up until 1982, company bargaining
was rarely used and was considered more a phase in the general conflict pro-
cess than a means of obtaining a lasting collective agreement. Its general use
was considered risky. Because union presence differed from one company to
another, bargaining at the company level would have been less favorable for
less well organized workers. There was also a risk of company egoism, and
possibly even of competition among employees. Centralized bargaining, on the
other hand, created a minimum level of protection that could then be improved
in more prosperous companies. Unions also lacked the human, material, and
conceptual resources to carry out effective company-level bargaining. The situ-
ation was more balanced at the industry level where the union was represented
by full-time leaders.
On the other hand, industry-level agreements were unable to impose effec-
tive restrictions on employers. They were therefore regarded as a point of de-
parture for union activists at the workplace, who had to use all available means
to obtain improvements. This was the goal behind the mobilization of workers
during conflicts. Strikes and demands were used for constant "harassment" of
management. Within the model, results obtained through collective bargaining
or strikes are no more than "social armistices" which hold until the unions have
built up enough strength to challenge management again. Strikes are not a
weapon related directly to formal collective bargaining since company-level
conflict and industry-level bargaining are often unconnected. Rather, strikes
are to mobilize the workers, many of whom are not unionized, and to
strengthen the position of the workers within the firm. Unions are not orga-
nized by occupational groups, even though they consist mainly of skilled work-
ers, since they aim at representing all workers whatever their job or category.
They therefore do little to influence work rules (Eyraud 1983).
French unions' approach to the company is determined by this model of
union action. The organization of work and the management of the firm are125 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
considered to be inevitably defined by the power of the employer. For the work-
ers, it is therefore more important to control the consequences of the organiza-
tional choices made by the employer than to influence these choices them-
selves. The introduction of Taylorist principles was seen as confirming this
analysis. In practice, French unions have left the company a free hand in or-
ganizing the workplace. This "Fordist social compromise" does not imply the
absence of social conflict; in fact, conflict is at the very center of union activity.
But it coexists with a tacit understanding that leaves company organization to
the company itself and focuses union activity mainly on the distribution of
income and other material benefits. The result is very low union involvement
in the governance of the workplace.
The ideologies of each of the two major unions contributed to this outcome.
The CGT, which is Marxist, sees socialism as the solution to the contradictions
of capitalist management. Involvement in a firm's economic decision making
under the present system is regarded as dangerous. The CFDT, in turn, advo-
cated socialist self-management in the 1970s. But this never translated into
concrete demands, even though the CFDT was highly critical of Taylorist prin-
ciples. Thus, works councils provide unions with an indirect but institutional-
ized presence, and they may be used to increase union influence within compa-
nies and with the workers. They are not, however, considered instruments of
intervention in the organization of the firm and of work. Moreover, union plu-
ralism often leads to union competition at the workplace, which stifles innova-
tive initiatives.
The cases of the personnel delegates and the enterprise committees are,
however, quite different. The personnel delegates deal with demands and griev-
ances, which corresponds directly to the union model of action. Once a month,
the personnel delegates have the right to express demands, and management is
required to meet with them. While the monthly meetings between the person-
nel delegates and management were designed for individual grievances to be
presented, this is rarely the case (Bonafe-Schmitt 1981). The personnel dele-
gates' main activity is to present general union demands, which are raised
anew at each meeting. Given that they are often accompanied by union repre-
sentatives, personnel delegates are actually a union delegation that meets with
the employer. Indeed during strikes, the personnel delegates use their meetings
with the employer to articulate the demands of the unions in order to help
obtain the desired results. This is not really formal bargaining since there is
no agreement but only employer concessions. The institution of the personnel
delegates also enables the unions to make their demands known to the employ-
ees, despite the hostility of the employers, and personnel delegates do play a
role in representing individual grievances, which is often done more infor-
mally. Through these interventions, the personnel delegates have managed to
bring together formal action, mainly by raising collective demands, and infor-
mal influence with respect to individual employee needs. To reduce the number126 Robert Tchobanian
of demands expressed through this channel, management in the 1970s rein-
forced the contacts between workers and the company hierarchy and created
opportunities for direct expression of worker interests.
The enterprise committees are in a different position. Created at a time when
large sections of the French union movement demanded that employees be
given a role in the management of the firm, enterprise committees never
had more than advisory status. While there had been plans to institute arbitra-
tion in case of disagreement, this did not materialize, and unlike their
German counterparts, enterprise committees were not given powers of co-
determination, although they did obtain rights to accounting and organizational
information. Their activities therefore remained of little importance, except
during the period immediately after the war; and the unions did little to change
this. After 1948, the CGT warned against the dangers of class collaboration
inherent in enterprise committee policies that were not directly unionist. This
corresponded to union fears of getting involved in management in the absence
of conflictual conditions. As a consequence, the number of enterprise commit-
tees declined until the mid-1960s.
The 1970s: Trade Unions Facing Company Social Policies
The creation of workplace union organizations enabled the unions, espe-
cially the CGT and the CFDT, to attempt to coordinate their activities with
those of the elected works councils. A growing number of enterprise commit-
tees were set up in this period, not only because of the new presence of the
unions but also because some companies tried to use the committees to limit
the role of the union locals. The position of both the CGT and the CFDT was
to make the union local the center of the representative system at the work-
place, with the enterprise committee and the personnel delegates serving as
sources of information and general institutional resources. Reality in the com-
panies, however, was much more varied. The actual structure of representative
systems, especially the relationship between the works councils and the union
locals, was determined by the interaction between employers and unions and
their respective strength. Three main situations could be found in the beginning
of the 1970s (Martin 1976). In the first, in which the unions were weak, both
actors favored normally functioning elected bodies despite their small influ-
ence. In the second, in which the employer was opposed to bargaining with the
unions, unions coordinated their activities with the works councils, which in
fact expressed the union position. And in the third, in which union presence
was strong and management preferred a single bargaining partner, the union
local was predominant.
The relationship between elected works councils and union structures can-
not be explained simply by existing legal provisions. The interaction between
the social actors and the context of this interaction played a predominant role.
Conflict over the rules of the game (the procedural rules) became more im-
portant than maximizing the benefits of representation (the substantive rules).127 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
Union difficulties toward the end of the 1970s illustrated the effects this had
on the role of the representative bodies.
At the beginning of the 1970s, rising social conflict and growing unioniza-
tion appeared to ensure that a new balance would be reached, with greater
union influence. Union locals were rapidly set up: while in 1970, 27.5 percent
of all establishments with 50 employees or more had at least one union local,
in 1978 this figure had increased to 58.4 percent. And yet, at the end of this
period, company social policies had undermined the stability of the workplace
representation system as well as of collective bargaining. Faced with this situa-
tion, the unions began to examine new strategies.
The employment crisis is often presented as the main cause of the difficulties
faced by the unions after 1977. Declining employment in major industries took
away social pressure and limited the benefits obtainable through union action.
The result was a decline in union membership. But other factors also contrib-
uted, among them the union's response to company participation practices
(Tchobanian 1990). New forms of work organization, direct employee expres-
sion, and flexible work schedules were often denounced by the unions simply
because these ideas came from the employer. Union locals were unable to in-
tervene through negotiation or enterprise committee consultations. Fear of
agreeing to technical solutions that might benefit the company while not in-
creasing the unions' conflictual power led the latter to denounce practices that
the employees often approved. The lack of any real debate among unions on
changed work practices and new needs of workers contributed to union de-
cline.
Employee expression is an area in which the rising difficulties were easily
observed. The CFDT had demanded it since 1973, but in a form that linked it
to union action. The other unions were less sure. Finally, it was the employers
who created opportunities for expression, in a form that corresponded to their
needs and competed with the unions, and especially with the personnel dele-
gates. For the unions, denouncing these practices to the workers was no longer
enough. The evolution of a new attitude was most striking at the CFDT, which
in 1978 accepted union-independent employee expression, provided that it was
negotiated at the workplace with the union locals. Less conflictual union poli-
cies were offered in exchange for recognition of the union's presence at the
workplace. At that time, the CNPF rejected the CFDT's propositions, only to
find them later included in the Auroux reforms.
The Auroux reforms tried to fulfill two needs. The role of the unions, which
were faced with considerable difficulties at the workplace, was reasserted. In
addition, the reforms tried to promote continued and intensified structural
change in response to new economic constraints. While unions were assigned
a legitimate role within the company, they were expected to accept major
changes in their practices.128 Robert Tchobanian
5.2.3 The Auroux Reforms: The Search for a New Industrial Relations
System
In 1982 the Auroux reforms redefined the collective rights of workers.
Union locals obtained the right to annual negotiations on wages and the organi-
zation of working hours; the involvement of the enterprise committee in com-
pany activities was strengthened; the health and safety committee was created;
and the right to direct and collective "expression" was instituted for employees.
The purpose of the reforms was to rationalize representation at the workplace
and define its relationship with collective bargaining on the one hand and the
social and human resource policies of management on the other. The role of
the unions as the employers' most important counterpart was confirmed—
unions alone can negotiate for the workers—but the enterprise committee and
the health and safety committee were given legal capacities to intervene in the
organization of the company. As for the right to direct expression, union locals
had to react to the practices of direct participation developed by companies.
The reforms tried to modernize collective representation by reinforcing the
importance of union action but at the same time favored dialogue on the new
problems facing companies. Their goal was to decentralize industrial relations
to a certain extent while changing the logic behind them (Eyraud and Tchoban-
ian 1985).
The Auroux reforms were proposed by a newly elected leftist government,
but they continued previous reform efforts by the French state. Since 1968, the
state had made several attempts to strengthen collective bargaining and social
dialogue in the regulation of labor relations. The 1971 reform had permitted
company bargaining, and the enterprise committee obtained supplementary
rights in the areas of working conditions and social information, for example,
a right to an annual "social assessment" in firms with more than 300 employ-
ees. In 1975, a study group described social relations in French firms as poor
and called for de-Taylorization of work organization and recognition of unions
as part of the firm (Sudreau 1975). The Auroux reforms gave these policies
a more concrete form while keeping in mind changed economic and social
conditions. The organizational rigidity of French companies, their declining
competitiveness, the use of new technologies, and the growing number of
small and medium-sized firms all had to be taken into account. The crisis of
the French trade union movement, its political divisions, and the negative atti-
tude of employers toward unions were other important factors.
The CFDT was the union most involved in the reforms. Obligatory negotia-
tions at the company level, the right of workers to direct expression, and the
use of experts in assessing new technologies were all part of a new strategy
that the CFDT had tried to develop since 1978. The CGT adopted a more criti-
cal position. While it approved of the new rights, it criticized the lack of means
to ensure that they were applied in the best interest of the workers; its strategy
remained attached to conflict. The FO, for its part, rejected company-level bar-129 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
gaining, fearing for the stability of bargaining at the industry level, and re-
garded direct expression as a threat to collective representation. The employers
denounced the reforms as creating new constraints on firms. They also ob-
jected to the requirement of dialogue with the unions at the workplace since
this reversed the deregulatory effects of the neoliberal social policies of the
1970s—despite the fact that the law did provide for greater legal and contrac-
tual flexibility.
Employer hostility and union distrust could have made the reforms fail. They
had been introduced in the hope that changes in the legal framework would
change the behavior of the actors. Ten years later, some changes are striking,
such as the increase in company-level bargaining (Caire 1992; Goetschy and
Rozenblatt 1992). Other parts of the reforms, such as the provisions for em-
ployee expression, have failed, at least for the time being.
5.3 The Auroux Reforms and Works Councils
The Auroux reforms appear to have affected the works councils least. The
only new elements were the creation of health and safety committees and the
strengthening of the role of enterprise committees in economic matters.
Worker participation in management, or "co-supervision" on the board of di-
rectors or board of trustees, was limited to two representatives designated by
the enterprise committee who would have only an advisory role. However,
works councils were strongly affected indirectly by innovations in their envi-
ronment and their new links to collective bargaining and the representation and
participation of employees. Before 1982, no legal framework existed that
would have required the actors to define these relationships clearly. For ex-
ample, direct employee participation, as developed by the employers, touched
on an area—the organization of work and social relations at the workplace—
that was traditionally outside the influence of works councils or union work-
place organizations. Likewise, since company-level bargaining was not obliga-
tory, works councils did not necessarily have to take it into account. Three
modes of social regulation could be found side by side: management initia-
tives, works council rights to dialogue, and union intervention. The Auroux
reforms encouraged the actors to coordinate the three procedures, giving works
councils a central position at the crossroads of the systems of collective action
of workers (especially union action, where unions were present) and of social
relations set up by the company (especially direct employee participation).
5.3.1 Difficulties Facing the Personnel Delegates
In 1988, only 43.3 percent of eligible establishments had personnel dele-
gates. The rate was even lower, 36 percent, in establishments with fewer than
50 employees, where personnel delegates are the only legally required repre-
sentative body. Moreover, the rates have been on the decline since the mid-
1980s (table 5.2).130 Robert Tchobanian
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Even in large companies, personnel delegates are negatively affected by
changes in the functions of the representative bodies. A recent study has shown
that their actual activity is often very limited (Tchobanian 1992). Company-
level negotiations have increased the role of the union delegates. Although per-
sonnel delegates are generally elected, their main activity, the presentation of
grievances, has long been connected with union practices of confrontation and
struggle. As a result, their position has been diminished by the institutionaliza-
tion of negotiations and the strengthening of the union delegates.
The crisis of the personnel delegates is an indicator of the crisis of union
strategies based on conflictual demands. The falling number of union activists
and the trend toward deunionization is another factor. Union locals prefer en-
terprise committees and union delegates, with their important role in dialogue
with management, over the personnel delegates. In addition, the social policies
of employers and the new direct participation practices have diminished the
often informal role of personnel delegates in handling individual employee
grievances. Personnel delegates have thus been reduced to their institutional
role, which is less apparent to workers. Worker attitudes also seem to have
changed, with workers having become more reticent about having a representa-
tive express their grievances for them. Personnel delegates were well adapted
to blue-collar workers; they seem to be less accepted by the new categories of
skilled workers, technicians, and engineers.
5.3.2 Enterprise Committees and Social Dialogue
The Auroux reforms strengthened the enterprise committees. Statistics con-
firm that enterprise committees are found in the vast majority of companies
with 50 or more employees. According to the ministry of labor, 79 percent
of eligible establishments held enterprise committee elections in 1990. This
percentage is slightly higher than in the early 1980s. Approximately five mil-
lion employees are represented by enterprise committees. Health and safety131 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
committees are also frequent; they exist in 65 percent of eligible establish-
ments.
Enterprise Committees and the Economic and Social Life of the Company
The law describes the enterprise committee as responsible for the "collective
expression of the employees" on decisions about the "management, the eco-
nomic and financial development of the company, the organization of labor
and production techniques." The law requires that committees be periodically
informed on a variety of subjects. Before management makes major decisions
on economic, technological, organizational, or social matters, it must consult
the enterprise committee. For example, the committee must be consulted on
such issues as mergers, transfers, or the purchase of subsidiaries; on collective
layoffs for economic reasons; on workforce training projects; and on the intro-
duction of new technology. As a rule, management cannot make a final deci-
sion without consultations, but it is not required to take the enterprise commit-
tee's view into account. Through the information it receives and the
consultations to which it is entitled, the committee can express the interests of
the workers, monitor the operation of the firm, and help the local unions act
with full knowledge of the facts.
To be able to influence the life of the company effectively, the enterprise
committee must have competence and means of action. The law provides for
economic training for elected representatives, an operating budget, and peri-
odic information. Studies have shown that these arrangements vary. Many
small companies provide neither economic training nor an operating budget,
and elected representatives do not always recognize the importance of these
(Le Maitre and Tchobanian 1992). Moreover, representatives are often ignorant
of their rights, especially when they are not union activists (Cam 1991). In
general, employers do provide economic and social information, for example,
on the firm's economic activity and finances, technological choices and related
investments, workforce structure, pay, and human resource policies. This infor-
mation, however, is not always adapted to the needs of committee members.
A study of 47 small and medium-sized companies in 1989 showed that the
information provided by management is often limited (Henriet 1990).
Another study, which covered 200 companies, found three typical situations
(Harff and Henriet 1988). In the first, the enterprise committee is not given the
information to which it is entitled. Management refuses to incur the expense,
and the elected representatives do not apply pressure to enforce their rights. In
the second situation, management provides the information required in com-
pliance with the law but does not worry about its usefulness. The committee
contents itself with the fact that the legal requirements are met, without trying
to use the information. This situation is characterized by its formalism. In the
third case, one or both parties try to use the committee's rights to develop more
dynamic practices. For example, management may try to make committee
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the company faces or may use the enterprise committee to transmit information
to the workforce about company operations. Workforce representatives can
then try to use this information to benefit the workers. The second situation
was found to be the most common one.
Consultation is a case in point. Enterprise committees must be asked for
their advice on all major company projects. Consultation is obligatory on em-
ployment, working conditions, working hours, the economic status of the com-
pany, and technological change. Through compulsory consultation, the enter-
prise committee can contribute to social dialogue at the workplace alongside
the formal negotiations conducted through the union delegates. Consultation
is more intensive where management sees the benefit of including the employ-
ees and their representatives in its social strategy and unions try to monitor
the management of the company. In firms above a certain size, commissions
supporting the enterprise committee can be created. In some areas, the enter-
prise committee may seek the help of an outside expert (e.g., a certified ac-
countant or an expert on technology and work organization).
The influence of enterprise committees on personnel management seems
more developed (Harff and Henriet 1988). On dismissals, the enterprise com-
mittee can call in an expert to help it make economic and organizational pro-
posals so as to reduce the number of layoffs. In most cases, however, the enter-
prise committee is informed only after the decision has been made. Its
intervention will therefore usually be limited to trying to negotiate a social
assistance plan. Consultations with the enterprise committee on economic mat-
ters often seem to be merely formal. Employers must provide information on
financial results, and an accountant paid by the company may be called in to
assist the committee. A study of enterprise committees in large companies
showed that almost half of them used this opportunity (Cohen 1986).
The influence of enterprise committees on work organization and technolog-
ical change is a more recent development. Enterprise committees must be con-
sulted on a company's workforce training programs. A 1970 interoccupational
agreement and a law require firms to have a budget for the vocational training
of their employees; this was confirmed by another agreement and new legisla-
tion in 1991. Enterprise committee consultations are required on both the prep-
aration and the implementation of training programs. A recent study found
that in approximately 80 percent of cases consultations actually took place.
However, in less than 30 percent were enterprise committees, or their training
commissions, involved in the preparation of a training plan at all stages. Thus,
consultation usually means that workforce representatives are allowed to ex-
press their views on a decision made by management, but not that they can
influence the decision itself.
Enterprise committee consultations on new technologies illustrate this. They
were mandated in 1982 when the significance of the technological changes
under way was realized. In the 1970s, the CFDT had strongly criticized the
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1977). The introduction of computer technology, with its effects on the organi-
zation of work, led enterprise committees and union locals to make technologi-
cal and organizational counterproposals. Enterprise committee consultation
procedures were instituted where "major" installations of new technology are
planned. Legally, the enterprise committee must be informed at least one
month prior to the meeting in which its advice is to be given. In companies
with at least 300 employees, it can with the agreement of the employer call on
the assistance of an expert, paid by the employer. If no agreement is reached,
the enterprise committee may ask the courts to decide.
Many difficulties have appeared in the application of these consultation
rules. A study of 83 cases in which enterprise committees called an outside
expert found that the result of the expert's intervention is strongly related to
general management acceptance of enterprise committee involvement in tech-
nological matters. In a conflictual context, expert advice has little influence on
the ongoing project (Lochouard 1990). Company projects have usually already
been firmly defined before the enterprise committee is invited to give its opin-
ion. Activities of enterprise committees concerning the social consequences of
technological changes, especially with respect to employment and working
conditions, are more easily accepted by employers than intervention in the
project itself, which is usually rejected in defense of managerial discretion
over work organization and investment. Technological experts are therefore
rarely called (Cam and Chaumette 1989). An overall evaluation in 1986 found
fewer than 200 cases in which experts had been used (Carre and Valenduc
1991).
Enterprise Committees and Indirect Wages
Enterprise committees are often accepted by the workers mainly for the ser-
vices they provide. Most important, they manage the company's social budget.
They sometimes also play a role with respect to benefits unrelated to wages, for
example, company health insurance plans or the management of the company
restaurant. In addition, enterprise committees may negotiate financial partici-
pation agreements. Committee involvement in defining and managing a firm's
indirect wages increases the variety of situations that exist in firms. Some en-
terprise committees concentrate on managing the social budget at the expense
of their more representative role.
Managing the social budget is the only area in which the enterprise commit-
tee is in the position of decision maker, within the limits of the budget provided
by the employer. There is no legal definition of the kind and amount of re-
sources the enterprise committee may control. A study on establishments with
more than 500 employees found a wide range of situations, from the absence
of any social budget to one amounting to 5.45 percent of total payroll (Dufour
and Mouriaux 1986). In most cases, the social budget varies between 0.5 and
1.5 percent of payroll. Managing these often large amounts can take up a major
share of the enterprise committee's time. While this is not really a representa-134 Robert Tchobanian
tive activity, and could better be described as a paternalistic one, it often deter-
mines the enterprise committee's image among the workers, and therefore the
outcome of future elections.
The enterprise committee's role in negotiating financial participation for em-
ployees is an exception to the principle of union monopoly over negotiations.
Financial participation entails the sharing of part of a company's profits with
the workforce, based on results. By negotiating a formal agreement, a special
tax status can be obtained for the amounts distributed. This provision, which
was legislated in 1986, has been very successful. More than 10,000 agreements
were in effect in 1990, and almost two million employees received on average
an additional 3.2 percent of aggregate remuneration in their respective compa-
nies. Financial participation agreements enable the firm to vary wages with
economic activity. They also sometimes include incentives; in 1990, 7.5 per-
cent of existing agreements linked profit sharing to productivity. Both the en-
terprise committee and the union delegates may negotiate agreements on profit
sharing; in certain cases, these have to be ratified by two-thirds of the employ-
ees in a referendum. In this area, therefore, the separation of functions between
enterprise committees and union locals is not clearly defined.
Enterprise committees also play a de facto role in areas not foreseen by the
law. For example, employees sometimes use the enterprise committee rather
than the personnel delegates to seek redress of grievances. Likewise, enterprise
committees may conduct informal (or de facto) collective bargaining with
management; this happens in about one-third of the cases in which compulsory
negotiations with unions locals do not take place. Also, formal bargaining with
the unions is sometimes preceded by discussions with the enterprise commit-
tee. Finally, the enterprise committee is the principal representative of the
workforce where no unions are present. The relative importance of different
enterprise committee activities varies greatly from one company to another.
The fact that enterprise committees exist in the vast majority of companies
with over 50 employees is therefore not in itself enough to appraise their actual
role. This is defined by which kind of enterprise committee activity is domi-
nant, and by the committee's position in the firm's entire workplace representa-
tion system.
5.3.3 Company-Level Bargaining and Works Councils
Mandatory workplace bargaining did not mean obligatory contractual
agreement. For opposite reasons, employers and, in part, unions were against
negotiating at this level. Nevertheless, the number of company or establish-
ment agreements increased quickly: 2,067 were signed in 1982, 5,165 in 1985,
and 6,750 in 1991. In that year, 2.5 million employees were covered, about
three-quarters of whom worked in companies with a workforce of 500 or more,
amounting to nearly one in five employees that were at all covered by collective
bargaining. In addition, between 1983 and 1986 more than 4,000 agreements
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gaining system appears to have greatly decentralized over the past 10 years,
the low union presence at the workplace explaining why only a minority of
employees are covered by the system.
The subjects covered in company-level bargaining are mainly wages and
working hours, for which the law requires annual negotiations. In 1990, 58
percent of company agreements dealt with wages, and 38 percent with working
time. Other subjects were classification (5 percent), employment (3 percent),
and training (2 percent). Company-level wage settlements make it possible to
get closer to real wage variations, sometimes specifying precise methods of
wage determination. Some agreements provide for general raises, while others
are more individualized. In 1990, 32 percent of company agreements provided,
at least to some extent, for individualized wage increases. Wage negotiations
at the workplace seem to have become acceptable to employers since they are
closer to the employees. Local unions, on their part, have come to accept ele-
ments of individualized pay increases, partially calling into question the tradi-
tional importance of seniority in wage setting.
These changes affect the works councils. In traditional industry-level bar-
gaining, wages paid at the workplace were often very different from those de-
fined in the industrial agreement, the employer being free to do what he
wanted. It is true that workplace unions could express their wage demands
through the personnel delegates, with the industrywide agreement and conflic-
tual worker mobilization as arguments. In this way, unions had some influence
on wages, even without formal negotiations. Company-level negotiations,
however, make union action at the workplace legitimate, although their real
effect is still being discussed. For some, the traditional weakness of unions at
the company level limits their ability to influence wages significantly. A study
of company-level bargaining has shown that in most cases, no more than two
bargaining sessions are held and union negotiators do not usually have the
necessary training. Except in large companies, workplace negotiations on
wages are not comparable to industry-level negotiations, sometimes leading to
an agreement that simply accepts formally the employer's offer without any
real bargaining. Conceivably, wage demands presented at personnel delegate
meetings were more effective than most company bargaining.
Company-level negotiations on working time and work schedules were an-
other factor that changed the balance between centralized collective bargaining
and the works councils. Major changes have taken place in the positions of the
social actors on this question. The unions were on the defensive in this area.
The employers, while they wanted greater flexibility in work schedules and in
the rules governing overtime pay, first were against decentralized bargaining,
but then realized the advantages of being able to depart locally from general
legal or contractual rules. In 1985 the employers demanded that negotiations
be held mainly at the company level, while the unions wanted industry-level
agreements. But in 1990, there were already 1,025 company agreements on
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use of equipment by having employees work successive shifts or on week-
ends.
During the 1970s enterprise committees had progressively acquired a regu-
latory role on working hours. The creation of a new level of bargaining reduced
their influence in this area. Enterprise committees are still being consulted on
hours, and studies show that they continue to play a part, although often an
informal one. Just as for wage negotiations, company bargaining on working
time formalizes regulation and thereby limits the importance of dialogue with
the works council. Moreover, negotiations give rise to differences between un-
ionized and nonunionized companies since in the latter working-time
agreements, made with the enterprise committee, have no legal status.
Other topics negotiated at the company level are not legally mandated, ex-
cept for the organization of the right of expression. Only a few agreements,
signed in the largest firms, deal with these matters. Usually their subjects are
linked to human resource management, such as classification, training, work-
ing conditions, organization of work, and employment. These areas are
strongly affected by the technological, economic, and organizational transfor-
mations that companies are undergoing at the present time. The negotiations
extend social dialogue to areas that had traditionally been dealt with by man-
agement alone, or only at the industry level. An example is an agreement at
Renault covering skill requirements, mobility, career planning, and work
involvement, as affected by the reorganization of the firm.
1
The prerogatives of enterprise committees and health and safety committees
in these areas were reaffirmed. Enterprise committees have gained a particu-
larly important role with the obligatory consultations on the introduction of
new technologies. The committees must be informed of the entire project, on
its organizational aspects as well as its social consequences. Collective bar-
gaining, by comparison, covers the effects of technological change on employ-
ment, classification, and career prospects of individual employees. Consulta-
tions with the enterprise committee on the organization of work and
negotiations with the unions on a social plan regulating its consequences for
workers are two aspects of an identical process of cooperation for change.
Enterprise committees have no powers of co-determination on organizational
matters, and employers are free to ignore their views. But, by coordinating
their activities with company bargaining, enterprise committees can increase
their influence on the employer's organizational and technical decisions.
Initially, company-level negotiations dealt mainly with matters that had pre-
viously been bargained at the industry level. Under a trade-off, employers ac-
cepted collective bargaining at the workplace and unions accepted more flex-
1. The importance of these matters for workplace bargaining is rising. A study of about 300
agreements on classification, vocational training and employment that were signed in the first half
of 1991 shows that 60 percent of the agreements applied to companies or establishments with
fewer than 500 employees. Agreements signed at the largest companies addressed a wide range of
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ible rules. To this extent, formal company agreements may have weakened the
more informal dialogue that used to take place with the works councils, with-
out giving them a new role. On organizational and human resources matters,
however, company bargaining remained limited mainly to large companies.
This is where a new balance between negotiations with the unions and dialogue
with the works councils had initially seemed possible. Recent "modernization
agreements" (see below) are aimed at this.
5.3.4 Direct Employee Participation
The development of direct employee participation was one of the reasons
for the Auroux reforms. Legislators recognized the importance of such partici-
pation for the economic and social modernization of companies. But they did
not want participation to compete with collective representation, through
works councils or unions, as it had in the 1970s. For this reason, the way in
which the employees' right of expression is exercised, both directly and collec-
tively, must be negotiated at the workplace between union locals and em-
ployers.
Employee expression is situated at the crossroads between collective repre-
sentation and social relations organized by the company. Its legal institutional-
ization pursued objectives that could have been uncomfortable to both employ-
ers and unions but also had the potential to overcome the deadlock at the
workplace and lead to a more dynamic situation. Several projects have studied
company-level bargaining, the implementation of agreements, and the follow-
up by management and personnel delegates on the subject of employee ex-
pression.
2
Employers were opposed to the law because it required them to negotiate
modes of expression with the unions. The CNPF considered employee expres-
sion part of the internal organization of the relation between the company and
its employees. Among the unions, the FO rejected the law, in the fear that
expression would compete with collective representation. Negotiations, how-
ever, often produced agreement. Between 1983 and 1986, over 4,000
agreements on direct expression were signed. Their implementation, however,
was disappointing. "Expression groups" often held only a few meetings. Most
of them were content with presenting grievances to management, making it
impossible for direct expression to find its own place in relation to other chan-
nels of representation. In 1989, an assessment by the Ministry of Labor indi-
cated that the majority of employees subject to the legislation on expression
were indeed covered by collective agreements on its implementation. But more
qualitative analyses show that in many cases, the agreement was no longer
applied. The attempt of the Auroux laws to place social relations at the work-
place into a negotiated framework has failed.
There are several reasons for this. One is competition from "quality circles,"
2. Many of these are summarized in Martin (1989).138 Robert Tchobanian
which during the period emerged in over 3,000 firms. Quality circles are unilat-
erally created by management, normally after informing the enterprise com-
mittee, and are often given the means to resolve problems on their own. In
some cases, they were intentionally set up to limit the impact of expression.
But it is also true that workers have often taken more interest in quality circles
than in expression groups. Through quality circles, workers can have a direct
impact on their workplace, while expression is typically limited to the defen-
sive presentation of demands and grievances to the employer.
In addition, the failure of employee expression was caused by inability of
the unions to develop a consistent position on the relation between expression
and collective representation. A study of about 100 locals of the CFDT, the
union behind the Auroux legislation, showed a wide diversity of union prac-
tices (Tchobanian 1989). Some branches had not signed any agreement, mainly
because they refused to allow groups to be led by middle managers. Most of-
ten, agreements were simply aimed at guaranteeing the greatest possible free-
dom of expression, treating the latter as a democratic right belonging to em-
ployees and different from union rights. Local unions came in only to transmit
employee demands to management. In other cases, unions adopted a more con-
flictual strategy, using the right of expression to mobilize workers for union
demands. Only rarely did expression groups cooperate with the enterprise or
health and safety committee to inform their activities and help prepare their
consultations with the employer. It is only in these infrequent cases that expres-
sion groups help improve the effectiveness of collective representation, notably
on the adoption of new technologies.
Since the 1970s, it has often been pointed out that the personnel delegates
were most vulnerable to direct employee participation. Indeed, weakening the
personnel delegates was one of the goals of the employers' new social policy.
With the right of expression, workers can express their demands directly, and
personnel delegates lose control of some of the problems that they had been in
charge of handling. By favoring freedom of expression rather than acting on
concrete problems, unions increase the difficulties of the personnel delegates
without safeguarding the future of the right of expression. Union strategy has
often been more supportive of democratic expression at the workplace than of
workers' participation in company life.
Enterprise and health and safety committees have sometimes played a differ-
ent part. The former have used their rights regarding work organization and
technology to include individual employees in their work, thus avoiding com-
petition and creating complementary relations between the collective position
they represent and the employees who contributed their know-how to its devel-
opment. The right of expression does raise the wider question of the place of
individual employees in works council activities. Depending on the size of
the firm, enterprise committees may form special commissions that include
nonmembers. On matters like technological change, direct involvement of em-
ployees in the work of works councils is often recognized as useful even by139 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
employers (du Roy 1989). Also, through their consultation rights, enterprise
committees may present their views on other participatory practices, such as
quality circles, so as to optimize their usefulness to the workers.
5.4 A New Balance for Workplace Representation?
The aim of the Auroux reforms was to improve coordination between the
various representative bodies at the workplace. The changed balance between
the social partners and the new problems to be dealt with through social dia-
logue motivated these reforms. But the actual representation system and the
place of the works councils in it continue to differ from one company to an-
other. Beyond the legally required system, new models of representation, better
adapted to present problems, are still being sought.
The Auroux reforms tried to create a new balance by reaffirming the central
role of the unions in worker representation. In part they seem to have suc-
ceeded. The CNPF no longer rejects the representative role of unions at the
workplace. But the low level of union presence and the wide variety of eco-
nomic and social situations in different firms lead to wide differences in sys-
tems of workplace representation from one company to another.
5.4.1 Weakening Union Presence in Workplace Representation
Union presence may be measured by the proportion of companies and estab-
lishments with at least one union local. In 1989, 51 percent of all establish-
ments with over 50 employees, and 70 percent of employees in such establish-
ments, were in this situation. Four years earlier, in 1985, these figures had still
been 57 percent and 76 percent, respectively (table 5.3). In smaller establish-
ments, union presence is much less common. Most employees, in other words,
do not have union representation at the workplace. Given union pluralism,
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tions or their view of what unions should do for them. Yet only a minority of
workers are unionized.
Union weakness is not new, but since the middle of the 1970s the number
of union members has dropped sharply (Bibes and Mouriaux 1990). Union
membership density in France seems to be the lowest of all Western developed
countries and has been falling faster than everywhere else (Visser 1991; Chang
and Sorrentino 1991). The CGT, the most important union in manufacturing,
has lost more than half its members during the 1980s, as has the CFDT. The
crisis of the CGT is continuing, while the other unions have recently had small
increases in density. Total union membership is today estimated at around 10
percent in the private sector. Paradoxically, French unions are at their weakest
at a time when they have more opportunity than ever to intervene directly at
the workplace.
The crisis of the unions affects the position of the elected employee repre-
sentatives. To be fully effective, the system created by the Auroux reforms
requires the presence of strong unions. Their absence or weakness affects the
actual impact of the reforms. Company collective bargaining needs workplace
union organizations, as formal agreements with the enterprise committee or
the personnel delegates have no legal standing. The problems of the French
union movement are not only low union membership but also lack of support
from workers in general, as indicated by the results of enterprise committee
elections (for a general overview, see Bouzonnie 1991).
Over the last 15 years, the distribution of votes among the different unions
and nonunion candidates changed dramatically (table 5.4). The most important
trend was the continuous decline of the CGT vote. Mainly based among blue-
collars workers and advocating class unionism, the CGT is today in a deep
crisis. However, the other, more reformist unions were unable to take advan-
tage of this, resulting in the second trend, a rise in the vote for nonunion candi-
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sonnel delegates elections normally should help establish a strong union
presence among elected representatives. But in the 1989 enterprise committee
elections, nonunion candidates obtained 26.4 percent of the votes, making
them "the largest union in France." By comparison, the CGT obtained 25.1
percent, the CFDT 21 percent, and the FO 11.2 percent. This decline in union
influence is particularly strong in small and medium-sized establishments, as
shown in table 5.3. Little by little, a dual system has come into being. In large
companies, works councils and union locals work together. In many small and
medium-sized companies, unions are not present, making company-level bar-
gaining impossible. Some employers want a reform to unify the various bodies,
to enable them to negotiate with nonunion, elected representatives.
5.4.2 Actual Structures of Workplace Representation
Presence or absence of union locals leads to two models of workplace repre-
sentation. In addition, where unions exist, the links between the different repre-
sentative bodies may fit several types. One source of difference is the frequent
de facto grouping of representative bodies around the enterprise committee,
especially where there are no personnel delegates. In establishments with be-
tween 50 and 200 employees, the enterprise committee is often the only, or at
least the most active, representative body. Moreover, workplaces differ in the
way in which the representative bodies interact, especially in the links between
union locals and enterprise committees. A study of 41 companies (Le Maitre
and Tchobanian 1992) found four main types of interaction. In the first, activi-
ties do not overlap. Each body plays its own role, the enterprise committee
concentrating on the management of the social budget and the union generally
not getting involved in the life of the company, except for annual bargaining.
In the second type, the enterprise committee is dominant despite the presence
of a union. The employer's desire to use it for dialogue, lack of interest in this
on the part of union locals, and the weight of its activities make the enterprise
committee the most influential representative body. This does not diminish the
company-level negotiations carried out by the union delegates. But since these
are limited to wages, they are of no consequence for other representative activ-
ities.
In the third type, works council activities are coordinated by the union lo-
cals, which use the enterprise committee's legal rights to information and con-
sultation. The enterprise committee becomes a union instrument, but with its
own place and role in areas such as the organization of work. Finally, in the
fourth type, the union locals dominate all representative bodies, using the per-
sonnel delegates or the enterprise committee to put forward union demands
regardless of their legal functions. Including those situations where no unions
are present, then, there are at least five possible types of interaction between
the representative bodies.
The purposes to which the representative system is thus put differ according
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activity are allowed in the system as defined by the law: the raising of demands,
centered around the activities of the personnel delegates and union pressure;
joint regulation, centered around negotiation and consultation; and the provi-
sion of benefits and indirect wages, especially the management of the social
budget. All three exist in all workplaces, but the actors, and in particular the
unions, tend to place different emphasis on them. The traditional situation
stresses the raising of demands. Negotiations were nothing but a pause in the
conflictual process, making it impossible to develop a joint definition of the
rules. Neither the employers nor the unions really wanted a negotiated proce-
dure for regulating the workplace.
With the Auroux reforms, periodic bargaining became an independent func-
tion aimed at establishing a joint definition of rules. This may be strengthened
by enterprise committee consultations, which sometimes may attain a domi-
nant position. This was one of the implicit goals of the Auroux reforms. In
reality, however, joint regulation remains restricted to a few well-defined
themes, and indirect wages often take up most of the activity, especially at the
enterprise committee level. The distribution of companies among the three
types depends on several, often interdependent factors. The logic of the actors
partially explains the choice of models (Reynaud 1989).
Some employers consider representation as nothing more than a legal con-
straint. Others try to use the representative bodies for internal communication.
They prefer the enterprise committee for its closer contact with the employees.
Employers may also want to formalize their human resource management
methods by agreement with a partner. Agreements are signed by the union
delegates, while the enterprise committee is consulted for the implementation.
Employers' attitudes appear to have changed during the 1980s. Some are con-
cerned about the decline in union membership and the risk of uncontrollable
demands by workers. Such employers increasingly accept the idea that eco-
nomic, technical, and organizational transformations must be accompanied by
social dialogue.
Three main attitudes are found on the union side. The CGT, attached to
conflictual unionism, seeks control over the works councils to ensure that a
"union logic" prevails at the workplace. Thus, union delegates are assigned
great importance, the personnel delegates are maintained as a tool for express-
ing grievances, and the enterprise committee must not be used for collabora-
tion with the employer. There is, however, a debate in this union on the kind of
unionism needed at the present time. Class unionism remains the ideological
reference, but some CGT leaders want to devote a greater share of the union's
activities to work reorganization. The CFDT, for its part, would like workplace
representation to have influence on management's organizational choices.
While the local union branch decides on its goals and strategies, the enterprise
committee must be free to perform its distinct role, particularly in consultation.
Similarly, the health and safety committee should have an impact on safety and
working conditions, questions that are very important to the CFDT. For these143 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
reasons, the goal of the CFDT is union coordination of the works councils and
a joint definition of rules through negotiation and consultation. The other
unions generally leave the enterprise committee free to do what it wants, with
the result that it spends most of its time managing the social budget. The CGT
and the CFDT each publish a journal for their enterprise committee representa-
tives, which gives policy directions and describes models of action in line with
the unions' strategies. The CFDT's position, now resolutely reformist, has
shown a major transformation since the 1970s.
The position of the workers themselves is harder to determine. Their expec-
tations concerning the representative bodies in the workplace have rarely been
studied. As to unions, workers express low motivation to participate in their
activities yet have great expectations regarding their outcomes (Beauville
1989). Concerning enterprise committees, worker attitudes do not necessarily
contribute to expanding their role in consultation. Workers know the enterprise
committee first and foremost for the material benefits it provides. In committee
elections, these strongly affect workers' choices. Since election results indicate
the relative strength of unions in the workplace, the activities of enterprise
committees on indirect wages are an important factor in interunion competi-
tion. It is important to note that by voting, nonunionized employees may influ-
ence the unions' position at the workplace, thereby affecting the legitimacy of
union activities.
In recent years, the relationship between workers and their representatives
has widely been perceived as problematic. Deunionization is not the only con-
cern. Human resource management has often become more individualized,
while the personnel delegates are on the decline. Neither the unions nor the
works councils have much direct influence on day-to-day personnel manage-
ment, although the capacity to make a difference for workers' daily experience
at the workplace is of highest importance for the legitimacy of representative
bodies (Hassenteufel 1992). At the same time, new forms of collective activity,
aimed at the defense of particular occupational groups, are making their ap-
pearance. This can be seen in the "coordinations" that have sprung up to com-
pete with the unions. The occupational interests of these groups, which are
concerned with employment and work organization, are difficult for the unions
to represent. The enterprise committee could help by including employees
from these categories in its work, or by taking the initiative on employee ex-
pression and offering this more participatory form of representation as an alter-
native to traditional mobilization through conflict.
5.4.3 A New Role for Works Councils?
The Auroux reforms had contradictory results. While the institutional space
for representative bodies was expanded, the decline of the unions threatens the
future of the industrial relations system. Probably, the legal framework defined
in by the reforms has not yet had its full effect. Company-level negotiation
could be extended in the future to subjects of a more qualitative kind (Lagrande144 Robert Tchobanian
1990). Several large companies have signed agreements in recent years on em-
ployment and skills, work organization, and human resource development.
Consultations with the enterprise committee could become an effective instru-
ment for implementing such agreements, provided the attitudes of the actors
change. Several proposals have been put forward to promote this, two of which
redefine the jurisdiction of representative bodies, in particular the enterprise
committee.
The first proposal deals with the workplace representation system in small
and medium-sized companies. The law is often not effective in these because
union delegates and personnel delegates do not exist. The Center of Young
Leaders (CJD) has suggested that a conseil d'entreprise (company council) be
created. This would be a single elected body combining the rights of all ex-
isting bodies. While joining the functions of the enterprise committee and the
personnel delegates is not difficult—it will be legally possible after 1994—
this is different for the union delegates. The CJD has proposed that the union
delegates be designated from among the elected representatives. The conseil
d'entreprise would thus have twofold legitimacy: as a mixed body, it could
negotiate like the union delegates and would be consulted like the enterprise
committee. The proposal tries to safeguard company-level bargaining in spite
of declining union presence, preventing the emergence of a dual system of
industrial relations in which unionized companies would be better able to en-
gage in social dialogue than nonunionized, usually small firms.
3 A single works
council system for small companies would make for a more active social dia-
logue.
The second idea tries to improve the coordination among representatives
bodies. A number of economy wide, interoccupational "modernization
agreements" signed in 1988 and 1989 promote development of advanced
methods of human resource management as part of economic restructuring,
addressing questions of technological change, working conditions, working
hours, and equal opportunity. The idea was that economic modernization can-
not succeed without social modernization. This was the conclusion of a report
submitted to the government in 1987 by the head of a major company (Riboud
1987). The report emphasized that the modernization of the French economy
must be carried out in cooperation with employees, enterprise committees, and
unions; that the social consequences of modernization must be anticipated; and
that measures must be taken to preserve employment and improve the content
of work.
The interoccupational agreement on technological change specifies the
place of social dialogue in the change process, providing for three negotiating
levels. Interoccupational agreements lay down general procedures and themes,
3. Small firms are where most new jobs are being created. In 1974, nearly 36 percent of all jobs
in the private or competitive public sectors were in establishments with more than 200 employees;
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mandating proactive plans concerning employment, requiring that attention be
paid to qualification and training, and defining the role of information and em-
ployee participation. Industry-level agreements provide more details in these
areas, depending on the special characteristics of each industry. For example,
an agreement signed in the chemical industry defines the roles of the enterprise
committees and the union delegates in case of major technological transforma-
tions. The enterprise committee is to be consulted on the project as a whole.
Having to deal with difficult technical matters, it needs information, the means
to analyze it, and the time required to produce informed advice. Technology
experts are mentioned among the resources the committee may need. The
union delegates are promised that negotiations will be held on the social conse-
quences of technical change. None of these elements is really new; in fact,
they correspond to the spirit of the Auroux laws. But the agreement recognizes
the importance of social dialogue and shows that enterprise committee and
union delegates have their distinct but related functions.
Some company-level agreements also deal with procedures to regulate
change and its consequences. A recent agreement in the Pechiney group clari-
fies the place of dialogue in changes in work organization. The goal is to set
up a system of anticipatory, proactive management by getting the enterprise
committee involved early. The union delegates are informed, and training con-
cerning changes in work organization is planned for them.
Agreements like these redefine the various representative bodies by promot-
ing a new interpretation of the idea of bargaining. The government has called
this "negotiated modernization." It includes not only formal bargaining but the
entire social dialogue related to modernization at the workplace: negotiations
with the unions, consultations with the enterprise committee, and involvement
of workers and the management hierarchy. The logic of the Auroux reforms
can be seen here. Attitudes among unions and employers differ widely on this.
While the CFDT signed the agreements, the CGT has not. The FO is torn
between its fear of becoming involved in management and its interest in con-
trolling the social consequences of change. Positions among employers are just
as varied. The employer confederation signed the interoccupational
agreements, but so far they seem to have been applied only in the largest com-
panies.
5.5 Economic Effects of Works Councils
One of the goals behind the creation of enterprise committees was to involve
employees in the economic life of the company. Likewise, the Auroux reforms
were meant to favor cooperative change at the workplace and to contribute to
economic progress through social dialogue. Their economic effects are diffi-
cult to assess, however, as the economic efficiency of representative bodies is
strongly linked to the market conditions faced by firms.146 Robert Tchobanian
5.5.1 Costs and Advantages
It is relatively easy to determine the direct costs of enterprise committees.
These consist of wages for the elected representatives during the time spent on
enterprise committee activities, other operating costs paid by the employer,
preparation of the information supplied to the enterprise committee, meetings,
and so forth. Some firms try not to exceed 50 employees to avoid these ex-
penses. On the other hand, in many firms enterprise committees receive more
resources than required by law, and several recent agreements even provide
financial assistance to the unions present in the companies. In both cases, these
expenses help set up structures of joint regulation. The legal requirements are
perceived as a burden by some companies, while others go beyond them; their
personnel management strategies are different.
The same observations can be made about the social budget. The sum of all
social budgets managed by enterprise committees and equivalent bodies in the
competitive public sector has been estimated at 15 billion francs. However,
these can hardly be considered a pure expense. A study of large companies
has shown that absenteeism is lower in companies with larger social budgets.
Similarly, profit sharing, which is a supplement to normal wages that some-
times reaches significant proportions, is linked to the economic results of the
company or to productivity. This seems to increase economic efficiency, al-
though the effect is difficult to establish.
Similar considerations apply to human resource management and work reor-
ganization. Through its right to information and consultation, an active enter-
prise committee can make a firm seek higher qualifications, make greater ef-
forts in occupational training, and implement career planning and internal
mobility. In some cases, such measures run up against management strategies
driven by market conditions, which prefer lower wages, less recognition of
special skills, and the use of fewer permanent workers. In such firms, legally
required training expenses, subject to enterprise committee consultations, are
considered a burden unrelated to the firm's needs. In other cases, management
strategy is already aimed at the development of human resources in response
to economic conditions, and enterprise committee pressure has different eco-
nomic consequences.
During the time of high growth up to the mid-1970s, industrial employment
increased strongly in France under Taylorist principles using a low-skill work-
force. The human resource choices of that period were compatible with fast
growth. Today, however, companies often lack skilled workers. Part of their
workforces, who were trained in the Taylorist era, are not able to adapt to new
skill requirements. Performance is reduced, and unemployment due to failure
to adjust is on the rise. An evaluation of the economic benefits of enterprise
committees therefore cannot be separated from economic and market condi-
tions. The enterprise committee's intervention can help make management
adopt and apply new policies. But such intervention is possible only because147 France: From Conflict to Social Dialogue?
it has become possible to go beyond Taylorism. Demands that used to be con-
sidered costs are now often considered investments in skills and adaptability.
Social dialogue can help make such investment choices easier.
5.5.2 Works Councils and De-Taylorization in French Companies
Taylorist principles have been contested for over two decades. But the re-
sulting practices have not been uniform. Schematically, three phases can be
identified. After 1968, the social crisis of the Taylorist organizational model
led firms to try to improve the quality of working life, the goal being to respond
to the workers' new expectations and to increase their motivation to work. In
the late 1970s, French industry had lost in competitiveness, and the economic
crisis began to be seen as lasting. Companies began to look for more flexible
employment and work organization (Boyer 1988). Finally, in the mid-1980s,
structural solutions were sought and a new paradigm of flexible production
emerged as an alternative to Taylorism (d'Iribarne 1989).
That new paradigm has several dimensions: total quality management, just-
in-time production, group work, and so forth. Technical change alone was not
felt to be enough; it had to be part of a wider modernization strategy that in-
cluded human resource development. A study of companies with 50 or more
employees in 1989 showed that managers anticipated skill shortages for 60
percent of their respective workforces. Facing unstable markets, firms look for
higher work skills and workers more adaptable to future changes. Training,
flexible work schedules, and human resource management in line with the
firm's environment became central factors in enterprise restructuring (Bechet
and Huiban 1992; Stankiewicz 1988).
The place of the works councils in this development depended on the nature
of change and the attitudes of the social actors. The priority of the quality of
working life policies of the 1970s was to restore dialogue with employees.
They were also often used to destabilize collective representation, including
the enterprise committee. Redirecting its activities toward company organiza-
tion was not facilitated by this, despite encouragement by the government. The
flexibility policies that started in the late 1970s were better suited for applying
the new system created by the Auroux reforms, especially when it came to
negotiations on working hours.
In general, worker expression seems to provide a framework for trans-
forming the relationship between employees and the management hierarchy on
the one hand, and between employees and their representatives on the other
hand. Enterprise committees and health and safety committees would seem
ideally suited to help improve union procedures for worker participation in the
life of the company. But in this respect the results have been disappointing.
The economic effects of enterprise committees can therefore be considered
mainly in terms of the "negotiated modernization" of the production system,
dealing with new technologies, training, and proactive employment and skills
management.148 Robert Tchobanian
In principle, one might compare the practices of companies with enterprise
committees to those of others without them. But enterprise committees exist
mainly in medium-sized and large companies. It would therefore be better to
distinguish between different types of enterprise committees with different
practices. This information, however, exists only in unquantified, monographic
form. Enterprise committees whose activities are coordinated by the unions
appear better adapted to influencing choices made by management (Le Maitre
and Tchobanian 1992). For example, the CFDT has developed a "skills net-
work" for use by enterprise and health and safety committees in dealing with
the effects of computerization, ergonomic analyses, and training practices.
Likewise, management choices may strongly affect the place of the enterprise
committee. Personnel planning may be conducted together with the enterprise
committee, depending on the goals and methods of management (Gadille
1992). Similarly, the intervention of a technology expert will have very differ-
ent effects depending on whether it is imposed on the employer or is the result
of company-level negotiations.
Another way of analyzing the economic impact of enterprise committees is
to look at differences between firms in human resource management and its
evolution in recent years. Vocational training provided to employees is an ex-
ample of a link between social dialogue and human resource management.
Training is both human resource policy and the result of institutional pressures.
However, while the enterprise committee has to give advice on a firm's "train-
ing plan," occupational training has always been more widespread in large
companies than in small ones and has always been used more by skilled work-
ers than by others. Moreover, these differences have increased since the mid-
1980s. More than ever, larger companies today consider training a necessary
step in the adoption of new organizational models (Podevin and Verdier 1989),
increasing the gaps that have always existed between firms.
Training effort may be measured by training expenditures as a percentage
of total payroll. Table 5.5 shows the differences between firms of different size
over time. The ratio of employees getting training in 1990 was 7 percent in
establishments with 10 to 19 employees, and 53 percent in establishments with
2,000 employees or more. Small companies create the most jobs, but they also
use the greatest number of unskilled workers. Large companies, on the other
hand, have reduced their workforces but attach more importance to skills
(Echardour and Maurin 1992). Two alternative approaches to personnel man-
agement can be observed, one leading to a flexible relationship with the exter-
nal labor market, the other managing a stable group of employees with growing
skills. Companies with enterprise committees and union delegates are gener-
ally in the second category, although it is difficult to demonstrate a causal rela-
tionship.
The results show that when works councils exist in small firms, they are
not strong enough to ensure that human resource development strategies are
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objectives of further training, and the resources to be used for it, are periodi-
cally negotiated at the industry level so as to affect the training policy choices
of small firms. Likewise, the government provides financial encouragement
and technical support for reorganization of work and proactive employment
management in small firms. Works councils are then mobilized for implement-
ing the new policies.
In general, the economic effects of French works councils with respect to
the adoption of a post-Taylorist work organization cannot be studied apart from
external conditions. The goal for the future is to make it possible for most
employees to influence the human resource policies adopted by their em-
ployers.
5.6 Conclusion
Works councils in France vary widely from one firm to another. The com-
plexity of the legal framework makes this inevitable. But high variation is also
the result of changes in the environment of works councils. In particular, the
decentralization of collective bargaining has tipped the internal balance of the
industrial relations system toward the company level, making works councils,
in particular the enterprise committees, more influential than ever.
The new importance of company-level bargaining and of enterprise commit-
tees proves that the Auroux reforms did help unions and employers change
their relations. At the same time, as developments at the company level have
become crucial to the future of industrial relations, unionization has rapidly
declined. The growing number of firms without union representation has led
to the emergence of a large nonunionized sector. Joint regulation in this sector
is increasingly rare. In particular, new practices in human resource manage-
ment have raised the problem of how either works councils or unions may
intervene in the organization of work.
How can a system of decentralized industrial relations be developed in a
country with weak unions? Can the mixed representation system, consisting of150 Robert Tchobanian
unions as well as elected workforce representatives, be maintained in small
companies? Will the differences in union strategies continue to grow, or can
they be reconciled? The Auroux reforms tried to deal with these problems by
setting up a new legal framework for increased social dialogue. But today, 10
years later, basic problems remain.
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